The Cuban Revolution of 1959 brought profound economic and social changes. The social structure was homogenized more rapidly than in other socialist experiences (CIPS, 1990) , the driving force behind this process being a wide-ranging economic nationalization encompassing 100 percent of the country's commerce industry, finance, and services and 70 percent of its agriculture. This was followed up in the 1970s by a push toward a socialist developmental model that took on many of the features and characteristics of the Soviet experience, especially after Cuba's integration into the world socialist market. The results of this policy were conflicting.
On the one hand, the island recorded sustained economic growth between 1976 and 1985 . Important social programs were put in place, and an incomeleveling policy was implemented. In 1989, for example, the largest salary differential stood at 4.5 to 1. All this had a strong homogenizing effect on the social sphere. In 1953 the poorest section of Cuban society had accounted for 40 percent of the island's total population but received only 6.5 percent of the island's total direct income. This share jumped to 26 percent in 1986. By contrast, in 1953 the richest section, constituting 10 percent of the population, received 39 percent of total income, but by 1986 this share had dropped to approximately 20 percent (Brundenius and Zimbalist, 1989) . Data on the period up to 1989 demonstrate that the main structural features of underdevelopment, especially in the social area, had been eliminated. Social and geographical disparities gave way to significant equality; population growth was balanced. Some 30 percent of the population were active in the country's workforce, 40 (CEE, 1991) . The dynamic forces propelling the economy also began to falter dangerously. Quantitative growth of the gross domestic product was accompanied by a larger drop in production efficiency (Carranza, Guti6ffez, and Monreal, 1995) . This became evident mainly in investments in construction projects, which took an average of 6 months to complete in 1975 and almost 8 years in 1985. Everyone in Cuba knows the story of the nickel-processing plant that has been under construction for over 20 years. The country's energy consumption efficiency also declined. At the end of the 1980s, Cuba's per capita energy consumption placed it fourth in Latin America. In relative figures, this was twice that of the United States and almost triple that of France (Figueras, 1994 The transformation that has taken place can be divided into two stages. In the first, the reform was characterized by a selection strategy aimed at quantitatively broadening the system. In other words, sectors capable of boosting exports were chosen to be adapted to world economic parameters in the hope that they would become enclaves of efficiency without being tied to the rest of economy. The end result was an economic-productive diversification that has been described as a &dquo;dual economy&dquo; (Burchardt, 1999 (Beruff, 1997) . The funds in these accounts are three times the amount of investments made by the state in 1997. Presumably, most of the cash in circulation is also in the hands of the wealthiest families. This phenomenon is linked, first of all, to the country's need to reintegrate its economy into the international economic system. With the opening up of (albeit still limited) spaces to the market in the area of domestic economic relations, inequality-generating market mechanisms have crept in.
At the onset of the crisis, the government continued to ensure wideranging employment guarantees, rigid rationing of basic supplies, and stable prices for consumer goods, but as production levels dropped most incomes, as well as the availability of goods on the domestic market, shrank noticeably. By 1992 real consumption capacity had declined to one-fourth of average nominal wages. People had more and more money in their hands and nothing to spend it on, and the Cuban peso began to circulate by billions. This dammed-up inflation gave rise to a black market and fueled its growth. In 1993, close to 60 percent of all the goods in circulation were in the black market, and by 1994 the open inflation rate had increased fiftyfold (Burchardt, 1995; Gonzdlez, 1995) . Although the strengthening of the national currency and the introduction of some market options in 1995 contained the more severe impacts of the illegal sector, it remained important. Price increases meant that the average Cuban family would require twice its regular income to satisfy its basic needs (Togores, 2000) . Because the austerity policy implemented by the state has considerably reduced real wages for the broad masses, most people can hope to supplement their incomes only via market activities in the informal sector of self-employed workers. Padilla Dieste (1997) monthly salary of a university professor in a single day just through tips. As a result, there is a shift of highly skilled labor to low-skilled jobs that dramatically devalues qualifications and specializations. This fact has had devastating repercussions for the entire social pyramid, the increasing share of highly qualified labor leaving the country being only the tip of the iceberg (Martinez et al., 1996; Urrutia, 1997 (Alvarado, 1996: 43) and that they continue to reproduce. A clear sign of this subjective discrimination is the limited presence of black Cubans in the political structure, in prestigious positions, and in the dollar sector. As I have mentioned, black Cubans are largely cut off from remittances because of their low levels of migration (Urrutia, 1997 Other elements of the achievements of social cohesion are the pension system, unemployment insurance, and an active employment policy.
These policies stabilized the precarious situation in the labor market and cushioned the social effects of the economic crisis. The potential of this social cohesion-albeit with a connotation of material inequality--can be conceptualized with the help of political sociology, which considers knowledge and social integration as resources-equal to material wealth-for the realization of individual and collective opportunities (Kreckel, 1992; Wilson, 1992) . Following this definition, Cuba has neither structural inequality nor its more severe form, social exclusion. Access to knowledge is distributed on an egalitarian basis and broadly socialized. General compulsory school attendance, the health system, the fragmentary public social services, and the promotion of sport and culture prevent social isolation. These public goods tend to equalize an asymmetrical income distribution, prevent the reproduction of social and ethnic selection via the social structure, and, together with state repression, keep the new material inequality from being expressed politically. The Diaz, 1996) . The main groups here are the family &dquo;as traditional solidarity enclave&dquo; (Kreckel, 1992) , the neighborhood, and the work collective (work often being conceived as an area in which solidarity was inherent).
The second stabilizing factor is the collective will to preserve national independence. Cuba Social cohesion and national independence can be summarized as national unity. This can be described as a single collective identity contained by territorial borders whose growth has benefited from social homogenization, collective upward mobility, extensive social security components within the system, high levels of organization and networking, the possibility of geographical exclusion of any opposition or individual dissatisfaction (up to now about 10 percent of the population has left the island), the authoritarian-torepressive policies of the state, the ubiquity of its doctrine, and the spatial containment of information because of deficient press freedom and lack of pluralist discourse. This collective identity will be conceptualized here as social and cultural capital. According to political sociology (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1998; Kreckel, 1992) (1983: 183) . This notion of incorporated capital, which Bourdieu describes as &dquo;resources originating in the fact of belonging to a group,&dquo; helps us to understand the cohesive force of national unity in Cuba.
The function of incorporated capital in creating identity can be observed particularly in the strong nationalism of the former underprivileged. Once again, being economically squeezed by the reforms, these groups demonstrate surprising loyalty to the system. In Cuba, material wealth and the different shades of incorporated capital are interdependent with politics, the economy, and the nation and acquire legitimacy and consolidation synergistically. Following the loss of material stability, the legitimacy of the system could therefore be guaranteed on the basis of incorporated capital and social reproduction. Because of this, I consider national unity the most important stabilizing factor and a third endogenous structural element of the Cuban transformation. Thus, the Cuban brand of socialism basically merges a Leninist state doctrine with an extensive social security system legitimated by the imperative of the defense of national sovereignty. Consequently, Cuba can be understood less in terms of orthodox socialist doctrine than as a radical nationalist regime. Ensuring this national unity, however, not only supports the process of transformation but is the most important source of insecurity.
BLOCKADES AND PROSPECTS FOR A NEW POLICY
The consequences of this analysis are clear. Bourdieu (1983: 191) identifies &dquo;the recognition of a minimum objective homogeneity&dquo; as a principal condition for the reproduction of incorporated capital, and one day Cuba's new social inequality must begin to destabilize national unity. Cuba's stability is fragile, and this situation can only be reversed through a new effort at homogenization. But since the reproduction of society has been guaranteed by factors that go beyond mere economics, stability will be achieved not on the basis of economic success alone but through political reforms. Therefore, the question of the future for Cuba depends deeply on the further political transformation of the regime.
The charisma of Fidel Castro remains the greatest guarantee of the stability of national unity in Cuba because it prevents fragmentation of the power apparatus. Charismatic rule usually lasts until the death of the charismatic figure, and Castro's pronouncements suggest that he intends to remain in control for life. Thus, he is careful to allow no one to challenge his leadership and promotes a political conservatism that tolerates structural reforms only as a last resort and only in most minimal terms (Mesa-Lago, 1997) . However, without deeper political reforms it is likely that a high price will one day be paid for this guarantee. Following this maxim of conservation of power at any price can lead to breakdown: &dquo;The actual political regime depends so strongly on the person of Fidel Castro that its future is now more than ever to be identified with his biological longevity. This loss of perspective destroys the ideological basis of the old regime&dquo; (Dominguez, 1997: 10 (Dilla, 1999; Habel, 1997 depersonalization of the system, liberalization of the economy and civil rights, expansion of the rule of law, democratization of the state's search for legitimacy, and some degree of diversification of the media. The Cuban Communist Party is being asked to allow differences within it in order to increase its internal democracy, to make decisions only collectively, and to disallow the occupation of multiple positions (Valdes Paz, 1994; Dilla, 1996a) . A central issue for the implementation of such a strategy is the strengthening of the Cuban parliament. For example, the question arises whether Cuba's problems should not be a reason for the highest legislative organ in the country, the National Assembly, to meet more than twice a year. Continuous sessions would tend to create a public forum in which current problems could be explained and discussed.
Effective democratization through a liberalization of the party and a strengthening of institutional parliamentarism and the subordinated levels of public administration (Burchardt and Dilla, 2001) (Burchardt, 2000) . However, in order to achieve this, the cooperatives would need to be granted the plural interest organizations and forms of articulation that the state has hitherto refused them.
Moreover, there is a need for greater autonomy of Cuban trade unions. The handling of the privatization of industries and the influence labor representatives exert over this process will determine the future political economy of (Dilla, 1996b (Burchardt, 2001b (1995: 168) once observed that modem pluralistic regimes have typically come into being, it is increasingly recognized, not because of some preexisting broad consensus on &dquo;basic values&dquo; but because various groups that had been at each other's throats for a prolonged period had to recognize their inability to achieve dominance. What was here intended to be a critique of Western democracy can be positively applied to Cuba: The evolution of an alliance for reform need not lead to the same collapse of the system as in Eastern Europe. However, without a new policy Cuba is likely to follow the example of these countries. Therefore, Octavio Paz, reminiscing on the first great social Latin American project of this century, the Mexican Revolution, reminds us where the best prospects for Cuba lie: &dquo;Anyone who has seen the hope will never forget it.&dquo;
